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ON A PERMANENT ARBITRATION TREATY. 
In the latest message of the President to Congress, in addition 
to the information that a definite and final settlement of the con-
troversy over the Venezuelan boundary has been reached, the 
fact has been made public that "negotiations for a treaty of 
general arbitration for all differences between Great Britain and 
the United States are far advanced, and promise to reach a 
successful consummation at an early date." It still remains un-
known to the public what are the details of the proposed treaty, 
or whether it is in contemplation to establish a permanent arbi-
tration tribunal, or merely to agree to arbitrate in all cases of 
disagreement. Probably in either case, in spite of the fact that 
the President speaks of ''all differences,'' the treaty will be found 
to contain certain reservations,as there is a substantial consensus 
of opinion that cases do sometimes arise in which arbitration be-
tween independent nations is inadmissible. 
If it shall prove that the governments of President Cleveland 
and Lord Salisbury have actually succeeded in forming between 
the two peoples a durable alliance which shall assure that for 
the future all questions arising between them shall be settled 
peaceably and honorably, without derogation from the independ-
ence or dignity of either nation, they will surely achieve a fame 
which the greatest of the world's conquerors might envy, but in 
view of the evident and apparently insuperable obstacles, it is as 
well not to be too confident, at least until the treaty is before us, 
that such a desirable consummation is actually within reach. 
Perhaps the anticipated treaty will be found to be no more 
than a mutual agreement that the two nations will hereafter set-
tle by arbitration all differences which have failed of solution by 
diplomatic methous, presumably with reservations of questions 
affecting the sovereignty, indepentlence or honor of either, but 
with no attempt to provide beforehand for any permanent court 
of arbitration or any invariable method to be followed in the 
selection of arbitrators. It would not be easy to pass any criti-
cism upon such a treaty, except that it would be a disappoint-
ment to whose who are expecting something more. It would be 
of value as an expression of the present mutual good will of the 
two powers, and would probably have some tendency to perpet-
HeinOnline  -- 6 Yale L.J. 67 October 1896- 1897
ON A PERMANENT ARBITRATION TREATY. 67 
uate that good will, but it would after all amount to little more 
in fact than the assurances of lasting peace and amity contained 
in many an existing treaty, and would be but a feeble bulwark 
of peace in any future clash of real or supposed interests. 
It may be that the attempt is to be made to provide in 
advance for the manner in which future differences are to be 
laid before the arbitrators, for the mode of selecting these and of 
giving effect to their decision. This would be going a little 
farther, but only to encounter difficulties without compensating 
advantages. It is not the constitution or procedure of the tribu-
nal that is the critical matter when any international question 
threatens a rupture of friendly relations, for such points are 
comparatively easy of settlement when once the governments 
have agreed that arbitration and not war shall end the dispute, 
and such an agreement could not be helped and might be 
hindered by an already existing treaty regulating the subsequent 
procedure. Should it happen on any future occasion that one of 
the governments considered the provisions of the general arbi-
tration treaty likely to prove prejudicial to its interests in the 
particular case it would form a temptation to refuse arbitration 
rather than a reason for consenting to it. 
General expectation, however, goes far beyond this, and 
looks for the establishment of a permanent High Court, to be at 
once the means of reconciliation of all disputes and a visible evi-
dence to all mankind that two great nations have forever 
repudiated the savagery of war as the ultima ratio gentium and 
have substituted for it, as between themselves, the peaceful rule 
of interna:tional justice. It is at least a beautiful dream, and 
until we know better we may hope that it is to prove something 
more than a dream, but the difficulties to be overcome are dis-
heartening. For, in the first place, how could such a court be 
satisfactorily constituted? If it were to be composed of an equal 
number of members from each nation there would be little 
probability of agreement. Absolute impartiality is too rare- a 
quality to permit of reasonable expectation that the judges could 
wholl~ divest themselves of national bias where their national 
interests were involved. It must be remembered that in most 
disputed questions there is much to be said for both sides, and 
that it is seldom that either party to a controversy is so clearly in 
the right that upright and intelligent men cannot differ in their 
judgment. If impartiality could be expected from any body of 
men in the world it could surely be from the Judges of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, yet we all remember how 
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they divided as members of the Electoral Commission of I876. 
If, in order to secure a majority decision, one or more members 
of the court are to be foreigners, then he or they will in reality 
give the decision and the American and English judges will be 
only the more relieved from any duty to be impartial, as the 
presence of foreigners would in effect be an admission that the 
others were expected to be partisans and in the guise of judges 
to be in fact advocates. It is perhaps theoretically possible, 
though it would certainly be somewhat anomalous, that a per-
manent Anglo-American court should be composed entirely of 
foreigners. 
But the obstacles in the way of devising and organizing a 
court are insignificant in comparison with those which would 
impede its successful working. How is it to be determined 
when and how an issue is to be submitted to its adjudication? If 
this is to be left to the agreement of the governments in each 
case, if they are to be as free as now to arbitrate or not to arbi-
trate, then there is no gain whatever; there is positive disadvant-
age in the existence of a permanent court. As already said, the 
agreement to arbitrate is the critical matter which when settled 
leaves subsequent details relatively easy. But the existence of 
a court would in no case tend to promote such agreement, while 
it might often hinder it, should either nation suspect, with or 
without reason, that the court as constituted was likely to decide 
adversely to its claims in any particular case. If, on the other 
hand, the court itself is to be clothed with power, either on its 
own motion or on application of one of the governments con-
cerned, to take jurisdiction in case of disputes without the con-
sent of both parties, then it is more than likely that the first 
attempt to exercise this authority would also be the last, for the 
only possible power to compel obedience would lie in the armed 
force of the other nation. It is almost uniformly admitted that 
certain questions must be exceptions to any scheme of perma-
nent arbitration; who shall decide whether any question in dis-
pute is within these exceptions? Each nation for itself, always 
and necessarily, unless they have surrendered their status as 
independent states, and a refusal to agree upon arbitration would 
almost surely be based upon such a claim, which would equally 
be made the ground for refusal to submit to the nominal 
authority of the court to take jurisdiction on demand of the other 
party. Suppose such a court to have been in existence one year 
ago, when the President's message about the Venezuelan boun-
dary dispute suddenly brought us to contemplate the possibility 
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of war over a matter which few of us had ever thought of as one 
in which we had any interest whatever. It is precisely that 
threat of war which has stirred up the demand that some means 
shall be found whereby lasting peace shall be assured, at teast 
between ourselves and England, but what could the court have 
done in that case? Nothing whatever; there was no question 
between England and America upon which it could have 
claimed jurisdiction or which could be decided by arbitration in 
any form. The boundary question was between England and 
Venezuela, the question of our right to intervene and to demand 
of England a certain course of conduct in relation to that dispute 
was no question of right in the legal sense at all; there was no 
law, international or otherwise, to give to, or withhold from, the 
United States such a right. It was a matter of national interest 
alone, a political question pure and simple, which only the 
supreme government of the nation could decide. What was true 
of the Venazuelan question is true of nearly all questions which 
could possibly need the intervention of arbitration to prevent 
war. The questions about which nations will fight are generally 
questions of their own national or dynastic interests or antipa-
thies; they will rarely fight over disputed facts or claims for 
damages unless they are in a temper to reject all settlement and 
to fight because they prefer war to peace. It is, perhaps, con-
ceivable that England and America might set up some common 
authority which, by the consent of both, should be endowed 
with power to consider and determine not only issues submitted 
by agreement in each case, but as well all questions where the 
interests or policy of the two peoples were opposed. If that 
were done, however, it would not be a court that was established 
but a supreme government over a confederacy of the English-
speaking peoples; but a confederacy the most fragile that it ever 
entered the mind of man to establish, with a government desti-
tute of the most essential attribute of government, the power to 
enforce its authority. If such a confederacy proved durable· it 
would prove that we were ready in fact for a far closer union, for 
the r~union of the severed branches in one vast Anglo-Saxon 
empire. There are some who dream of such a union, and pos-
sibly the future may bring it forth, but it certainly is not yet de-
sired by the mass of the people on either side of the ocean. 
Most men who have given the subject careful thought have 
found themselves forced to the conclusion that a permanent 
court of arbitration between two nations alone is impracticable, 
but many have believed that such a court might be established 
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by several nations, and have hoped that the principal states of 
Europe and America may be brought to enter into such a plan. 
It would seem that the difficulty of constituting an impartial 
court might be lessened if the parties to the agreement were 
numerous, and it also appears, at least at first sight, as if the 
problem of how to secure obedience to its decrees might be 
solved by the pledge of every state to unite to execute them, by 
force of arms if need be, against a recalcitrant member. But 
in truth this project is more hopeless than the other. Such a 
combination would be as truly the formation of a new confeder-
acy as if only two nations were included, and the greater the 
number of the members and the greater the diversity of their 
interests the more certainly would it be fore-doomed to failure. 
The different states would be no less jealous of each oth~r, no 
less determined to decide for themselves wherein their interests 
lay and to further that interest by hook or crook, than before; it 
might even· be that their jealousy would only be increased by 
the claim of alien states to an increased right of interference. 
Faith in the prospect of any such league of peace would seem to 
indicate either an ignorance of modern European history, or an 
unquenchable hopefulness that what human nature has been in 
the past it will not be in the future if only it can be shown a 
better way. If we can be assured that the rulers of mankind 
will hereafter prefer the general welfare to the satisfaction of 
their own ambitions, the peace of the world to the aggrandize-
ment of their own states; if we can be sure that no treaties are 
made with the secret intention that they shall be broken when it 
is safe and profitable to break them; that no alliance which is 
proclaimed to the world shall be undermined by other treaties 
kept secret from the partners in the alliance; in short, when we 
may be sure that statesmen have adopted the Golden Rule as 
the actual rule of politics; then we can confidently hope for the 
brilliant success of a permanent international agreement for arbi-
tration-only, it will be wholly superfluous. 
Edward V. Raynolds. 
